United States president Donald Trump often criticizes NATO allies for not hitting defense spending goals, even going as far as to say he would “encourage Russia to do whatever they want” with those who don’t spend enough (Fitz Gerald Reference Fitz Gerald2024). While many see Trump’s style as blunt and undiplomatic, pressuring allies over contributions isn’t new: the Biden administration managed to get Japan to increase payments for hosting US troops, former president Barack Obama ran an “anti-free-rider campaign” in Libya (Galbert Reference Galbert2016; Goldberg Reference Goldberg2016), and Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson also pushed European allies to step up their defense commitments (Becker et al. Reference Becker, Kreps, Poast and Terman2024). Although debates about sharing defense costs and underspending have drawn plenty of attention from both the public and scholars (e. g., Auerswald Reference Auerswald2004; Haesebrouck Reference Haesebrouck2017; Hallams and Schreer Reference Hallams and Schreer2012, Sandler and Shimizu Reference Sandler and Shimizu2014), “defection” within alliances can show up in different ways since the “burden” goes beyond money – it might mean refusing military operations participation (like Germany or France opposing the 2003 Iraq War), buying weapons from rival countries (Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems), blocking new members from joining (Turkey’s and Hungary’s roadblocks on Sweden’s NATO bid), or inconsistent backing of sanctions abroad (the EU hesitating on sanctions against Iranian or Chinese targets; see Daniels Reference Daniels2024; Geranmayeh Reference Geranmayeh2018).
As these examples show, member states sometimes choose to go against what’s expected, which can hurt alliance unity and mess with others’ strategic plans. When this happens, the stronger partner has choices: they can ignore it to avoid breaking up the alliance or take “corrective measures” aimed at getting compliance back on track while warning other members not to follow suit. These measures range from talk-like publicly calling out partners-to harder actions like imposing sanctions or cutting off military support, all the way up to ending the alliance altogether.
A key factor that affects how well these corrective steps work is how credible they’re seen as being (Snyder Reference Snyder1997). This credibility depends heavily on whether people back these moves at home. If there isn’t strong popular support for them domestically, targeted states might expect this weak backing and use it strategically against the sender country. On the flip side, when corrective actions have solid public support behind them, they’re taken more seriously by targets and carry more diplomatic weight.
Despite how important public opinion is for shaping how alliances are managed effectively, there hasn’t been much research looking at this angle closely. To help fill that gap, I looked into how people feel about using corrective policies against security allies who don’t meet their commitments. More specifically: what influences American citizens’ support for pressuring uncooperative allies? I put forward three main ideas. First: Americans will generally favor corrective measures against allies who don’t cooperate well-with a stronger preference for tougher actions. Second: learning about an ally’s misbehavior will make people view alliances less favorably and want America to reduce its contributions there. Third: factors like whether the ally is a democracy or authoritarian regime, its military strength, and if there’s a formal treaty with the US shape public views on these corrective actions.
The evidence comes from a preregistered survey experiment involving over 1,502 American adults representing the nation. Footnote 1 Results clearly support these ideas. Firstly, most Americans back taking action against uncooperative allies-economic sanctions or cutting military aid got way more approval than just verbal criticism alone. Secondly, hearing about bad behavior makes people want less American involvement financially or militarily-but reactions depend on what exactly went wrong. Buying weapons from rivals like Russia/China or refusing troop deployment outrank simple financial shortfalls in severity of disapproval. Thirdly-and interestingly-the type of regime matters a lot: folks are less inclined toward punitive steps if an ally is democratic versus authoritarian. Meanwhile military strength or formal treaties didn’t noticeably change opinions.
This study breaks new ground by experimentally showing that many Americans support putting pressure on unreliable alliance partners-and highlights how public opinion plays into managing international security ties. It adds valuable insight into growing research exploring what ordinary citizens think about military alliances (e. g., Chu, Ko, and Liu Reference Chu, Ko and Liu2021; Lee and Goidel Reference Lee and Goidel2022; Tomz and Weeks Reference Tomz and Jessica2021). Previous work mostly focused on how alliances encourage folks’ support for defending partners with force (e. g., Kreps and Kriner Reference Kreps and Kriner2024; Tomz, Weeks, and Bansak Reference Tomz, Jessica and Bansak2023); here I explore something else-how disagreements within alliances shape preferences toward punishing less cooperative members.
The rest of this paper first builds theory around why publics might prefer certain responses when dealing with uncooperative security allies along with factors that could affect those preferences. Then I detail my preregistered vignette experiment used to test those ideas before discussing findings thoroughly. The conclusion sums everything up while offering policy insights plus directions future studies might take.
Managing Alliances & Support for Punitive Actions
Security alliances rarely run smoothly – internal tensions are normal rather than exceptions because cooperation among countries always faces collective action challenges. By joining an alliance everyone benefits regardless if some contribute less-a classic free-rider problem since no one can be excluded once inside. Olson & Zeckhauser summed this decades ago(Reference Olson & Zeckhauser1966). Smaller nations especially may try skirting obligations if they believe bigger powers shoulder too much cost. Big players usually gain more benefit relative to expenses so they tolerate burden imbalance but smaller ones exploit it rationally(Thies Reference Thies1987). Without strong enforcement free-riding becomes tempting across forms-from cutting financial input down to avoiding troops deployment.
To deal with such issues major powers must sometimes push back. But since allied countries can’t credibly threaten each other militarily like enemies do, their leverage relies instead on nonviolent correction strategies. These punish defection attempts while promoting future cooperation. A big divide exists between private vs public corrections. Private approaches keep problems under wraps reducing embarrassment risks but lack political punch. Public signals carry weight because leaders risk domestic backlash showing resolve openly(Yarhi-Milo Reference Yarhi-Milo2013). They warn both target governments & audiences alike(Fearon Reference Fearon1994).
Another difference lies in intensity. Low-level fixes involve rhetoric only-naming & shaming exploits shared norms hoping peer pressure changes behavior(Keck & Sikkink Reference Keck et al1998, Lebovic & amp Voeten Reference Lebovic et al2009). Shaming works best where reputation means lots(Crescenzi Reference Crescenzi2018) but without real penalties it often fails because governments weigh costs carefully(Tingley & amp Tomz Reference Tingley et al2022). For instance Beckers et al found shaming NATO spenders counterproductive(Becker et al. Reference Becker et al 2024)and Blankenship showed threats don’t sway publics much either unless trust erodes(Blankenship Reference Blankenship2024).
Stronger steps include tangible punishments like sanctions or cutting aid. They hit wallets/military capabilities directly making resistance costlier. Kupchan emphasized coercion restored Gulf War coalition cohesion(Kupchan Reference Kupchan1988)while Pressman documented US balanced carrots/sticks kept Israel quiet in 1991 Persian Gulf conflict(Pressman Reference Pressman2012).
Beyond effectiveness leaders deploy such tough moves partly due to politics. They send signals domestically proving leadership strength(Mc Lean&Whang Reference Mc Lean&Whang2014, Galtung1967)which often boosts popularity despite uncertain outcomes(Whang Reference Whang2011, Drezner Reference Drezner2021). Removing sanctions later poses challenges lest leaders appear weak too(Drezner References Drezner).
Voters also want fairness-they dislike being taken advantage of. Fehr& amp Schmidt document humans seek equity in groups(Fehr & amp Schmidt1999); cooperative acts breed cooperation while defection breeds retaliation(e. g., Fehr& amp Gächter2000). In foreign policy terms, this means citizens reward reciprocity but get annoyed by freeloading triggering calls for punishment(Chilton, Milner,& amp Tingley 2020).
People also judge policies based on perceived chances of success(Gelpi et al2009, Kohno et al2021). Stronger penalties look likelier effective which explains why costly economic/military options gain better backing compared to soft words.
Still, it isn’t automatic. Citizens value partnerships too. Some may oppose harsh steps fearing damage/dissolution. Tomz/Weeks find Americans strongly favor defending allied states(Tomz& amp Weeks)while Chu/Ko/Liu highlight emotional ties reinforce multilateralism(C. Ko L.)Such goodwill could push voters towards patience over punishment given long-term benefits.
So here are two predictions:
H1: Citizens will back corrective actions targeting uncooperative security partners.
H2: Among possible tactics, the public prefers harsher economic/military options over mere rhetoric.
Since taxpayers care about costs Dellmuth/Tallberg note fights over funding common goods frequently spark politics(Dellmuth& amp Tallberg2015), and downturns lower popular backing overall e. g. for foreign aid(Heinrich, Kobayashi, Bryant16). Lee/Goidel show highlighting NATO cost decreases US positivity toward alliance(L/G22).
Public attention spikes when contribution gaps exist. Brutger/Rathbun21&Yeung/Quek22 emphasize fairness concerns rise when others slack. Similarly tax compliance drops when cheating spreads(R. Alm/Mc Clelland/Schulze99)and Kiratli/Ertan24 prove US voters weigh others’ UN payments heavily. Motivated by all this, I expect informing citizens about shirking will sour views/reduce desired US involvement:
H3:(a) info on uncooperative allies leads citizens demand less US investment,(b) lowers overall pro-alliance attitudes.
What Changes How People Feel?
The Kind Of Government And Power Matters
Support depends hugely on perceived costs/effectiveness/norms. Heinrich/Kobayashi/Peterson17 argue citizens want low-cost yet effective legitimate policies(Mc Lean/Roblyer17 too.). I propose three key things matter here-the ally’s political system, military strength, and treaty status with America-all shape views significantly.
Democratic Or Not?
Democracies tend stickier friends thanks institutional features like elections/accountability/bureaucratic stability(Gaubatz96 ; Leeds03 ; Pilster11 ). Shared democratic values ease suspicions making monitoring easier(E/O’Halloran99 ). So voters hesitate punishing fellow democracies fearing harm/alliance breakups. They give democracies “benefit of doubt” even when issues arise. Politics aside, normative ties count too. Democratic peoples share moral bonds/reasonableness reducing threat fears(Dixon94 ) so cracking down looks wrong(Bd M/Siverson95 ; Risse-Kappen95 ).
H4 says supporters won’t back tough measures much vs democratic defectors compared authoritarian ones.
The Ally’s Military Might
If an ally packs serious firepower, punishment feels riskier/costlier. Strategic loss looms large losing powerful friends hurts ability project power. Less capable partners easier targets since weaker dependence/higher incentives stay loyal. Strong militaries resist outside pressure better. This means voters should prefer penalizing weaker vs stronger pals(H5 predicts lower backing vs powerful ones).
Treaty Or Not?
Diplomatic studies distinguish formal legal pacts(NATO etc.)from looser alignments(say USA-Israel)(Snyder97 ; Wilkins12 ). Formal deals create clearer duties, bigger structures facilitate talks/enforcement enhancing trust(Cooperation socialization March&Olsen83 helps here too.)Thus pressing treaty-bound partners risks violating norms/sparks anger/public distrust leading skepticism(H6a posits less approval if treaty exists.)But some say law formality irrelevant. People focus outcomes over legal details(Toshkov/Mazepus/Dimitrova24 ). Political debates blur lines anyway, NATO spending guidelines act practically binding(O’Shea/Maslow21 ), so maybe H6b expecting little difference holds true instead regarding treaties influence
How The Study Was Done
I tested all hypotheses via preregistered vignette experiments Dec13-20 2024 using Qualtrics surveying 1502 eligible American voters matching Census quotas. By gender age education. To keep data clean failed attention check takers were excluded. Results stable including them though(Appendix tables referenced.). Before experiment collected demographics after ideology/politics measured. Tables A1/A2 cover balance/details. Experiment intro explained: “As you know, the US has many global military friendships, some formalized treaties, some informal understandings. But sometimes some do things conflicting w. US interests. Would you please evaluate five cases? Rate govt response.” Respondents saw vignettes varying five traits: First was kind of misconduct covering spending shortfalls/refusing joint troops/buying rival arms/blocking new member/jumping off sanctions. Second through fourth varied regime type(mixed/democracy/autocracy), military power(levels basic/moderate/advanced ), formal treaty presence. Final variable was US reaction(five levels): public denounce, economic penalty, military aid cut, end alliance, no change. Each vignette said: “Country X [named differently], US ally,[committed one offense].” Followed by: “Has [regime type],[military capability], and [formal/informal] tie.” “In response government plans:[chosen reaction].” Respondents rated agreement “How much do you agree…?” zero-to-ten scale. This approach follows political communication experimental standards capturing ex post evaluation better reflecting real opinions vs forced choices reducing bias/spillover effects. Next asked two randomized questions testing H3: Should government increase maintain reduce contributions?(scale three points) How favorable are you toward having alliance?(zero-eleven scale) Figure A1 shows example vignette. In total respondents did five tasks yielding ~7500 observations. Power tests confirm enough data detecting meaningful effects. Randomization ensured balance(Table A2a).
What We Found Out
The first set answers H1/H2:I ran regressions predicting approval ratings clustered per respondent. The left panel Fig 1 plots average predicted approval per policy option. Right panel breaks down effects by misconduct types.Differences Among Individuals
Explored partisan ideology influences. Republicans tend lean toward harsher policies breaking alliances Democrats prefer status quo. Both sides closer aligned supporting intermediate corrections. Ideology gradient clearer: right-wing folks embrace punitive options way more(left-wing wary)(appendix figure/table shows stats).Double Checking Results
Included inattentive participants, re-ran models adding demographics/trust/political interest controls. Outcomes stayed steady. Education/trust/government faith boost approval rates helping confidence findings reliable.
Wrapping It Up
When facing unruly security partners leaders face tough choices: either ignore issues risking repeated offenses or act firmly applying pressure restoring order. Corrective moves need domestic backing. To understand citizen mood, I studied American views finding solid support especially for tougher economic/military responses. Voters dislike doing nothing creating leader incentives push reluctant allies harder. Not surprisingly democratic partnerships soften appetite for punishment unlike autocracies. Military muscle/formal agreements barely changed minds. Despite risks coercion remains preferred approach balancing deterrence/preservation. Leading politicians should beware potential backlash including resistance/rally-round-the-flag effects limiting sanction success. Examples like CAATSA restrictions versus Turkey illustrate limits. Realistically correcting misbehaving friends demands weighing short term gains versus long term damage carefully. Further research might compare hidden/private diplomacy vs open pressure explore strategic threat perception impacts plus cross-national differences extending beyond security cooperation. For now findings enrich understanding why publics matter deeply shaping alliance dynamics nationally/globally.
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