Canada is one of the most dynasty-driven democracies globally (Van Coppenolle and Smith Reference Van Coppenolle, Smith, Jenkins and Rubin2022), with many political families holding office at both provincial and federal levels. This tradition goes back to the mid-1700s and has continued ever since, making it one of the longest-running streaks of family-based political presence in legislative bodies. These dynasties reflect a lasting legacy from Canada’s colonial past. Families like the Trudeaus, Merciers, Fords, and Regans have had multiple generations serve as prime ministers or cabinet members over decades. Such family ties bring up important questions about fairness in democracy-especially if they give some candidates an unfair edge or career perks.
The link between being part of a political dynasty and certain privileges has attracted more academic interest recently (for a review see Geys and Smith Reference Geys and Smith2017; Van Coppenolle and Smith Reference Van Coppenolle, Smith, Jenkins and Rubin2022). Studies show that people from these dynasties often get electoral benefits thanks to their family connections (Feinstein Reference Feinstein2010; Fiva and Smith Reference Fiva and Smith2018; Laband and Lentz Reference Laband and Lentz1985), though what triggers a dynasty’s formation isn’t clear-cut. Ernesto Dal Bó et al. (Reference Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder2009) along with Pablo Querubin (Reference Querubin2016) argue that longer time in office helps create dynasties in places like the US or Philippines. But this doesn’t seem to be true in countries like Norway or the UK (Fiva and Smith Reference Fiva and Smith2018; Van Coppenolle Reference Van Coppenolle2017).
Compared internationally, Canada is a great example to study this topic. Its political system was shaped by British imperial rule but also as a response to American republicanism (Dawson Reference Dawson1954; Epstein Reference Epstein1964). On one side, Canada follows the Westminster constitutional monarchy model with an appointed upper house. On the other hand, unlike Britain’s landed aristocracy but similar to the US frontier history, it lacks an old nobility class but shares roots in colonial democracy (Antoine et al. Reference Antoine, Inwood, Minns and Summerfield2022). This mix allows room for social mobility alongside undemocratic features like an unelected Senate-which can encourage nepotism or favoritism.
Canada’s French-speaking community adds another twist when it comes to political families. Centered mostly in Quebec historically ruled by semi-feudal systems with tight kinship ties (de Tocqueville Reference de Tocqueville2003), this setting probably made family influence even stronger politically (Lemieux Reference Lemieux1971). Family power likely existed elsewhere too before 1867 Confederation when colonies each had their own assemblies dominated by local elites connected through families.
Despite having election records going back centuries, there’s surprisingly little research on how Canadian political dynasties formed or how much advantage they actually get at the ballot box here. While Daniel Smith (Reference Smith2018) plus Brenda van Coppenolle & David Smith (Reference Van Coppenolle, Smith, Jenkins and Rubin2022) include Canada among several countries studied comparatively on this issue, Matthew Godwin’s work stands out as one systematic study focused on Canadian political families so far (Reference Godwin2018). In this article we add more evidence by looking at legislative careers over 250 years using detailed data from Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick & Nova Scotia-the first four provinces of Canada starting 1758-and federal records post-1867 including House & Senate members too. Having both provincial & federal info lets us see differences within Canada while accounting for bigger cultural factors too. Our findings confirm that being part of a dynasty offers some career perks mainly at the provincial level-though effects aren’t huge-and family ties also increase chances of being picked for Senate seats or cabinet roles federally & provincially. Echoing studies on parliamentary democracies generally (Van Coppenolle Reference Van Coppenolle2017), unlike presidential systems such as US Congress where tenure matters most for dynasty formation (Dal Bó et al., 2009), we find no proof tenure causes dynasties here.
Political Families at Work
While business succession gets tons of attention (e. g., Davis & Harveston 1998), there isn’t much research explaining why political dynasties form under democratic rules. Still we know kids tend to follow parents into politics more than average folks do-except farmers or self-employed types don’t show this pattern much either way(Dal Bó et al., 2009; Laband & Lentz1985). This hints that dynasties give would-be politicians advantages like learning skills early on, voter loyalty thanks to name recognition, and incumbency perks(Feinstein 2010; Fiva &Smith 2018; Geys 2017 etc.). In America specifically, Laband & Lentz(1985) say politics may become “a hereditary skill” passed down through generations providing loyal voters plus bigger incumbency edge compared with outsiders. Voters tend to feel warmer towards dynasty candidates versus newcomers who don’t share those names(Feinstein 2010; Smith 2018). Even Norway finds electoral edges for relatives despite closed-list proportional representation elections(Fiva&Smith18)-which means party bosses pick candidate order anyway!
Beyond just votes, dynasty members also climb faster internally. They’re likelier appointed cabinet posts-but only if previous relatives had them too(Smith&Martin17; Van Coppenolle17). We think this will hold true for Canada just like Ireland(Smith&Martin17)or UK(Van Coppenolle17): since parliaments pick cabinets from elected members, family ties help inside politics letting descendants rise quicker than newbies.
What about how these dynasties start? The best study yet(Van Coppenolle&Smith22) looked across15 rich democracies including Canadian parliament. Long story short: political heredity declined everywhere except Japan&Ireland where parties are weak&elections personal. Similarly, in Canada after Confederation, the number of new dynasty politicians fell but existing ones still got extra cabinet picks. Authors think modernization, institutional shifts, and election reforms explain these patterns well.
Another big angle comes from Dal Bó et al.(09) who found long tenure drives dynasty creation in US Congress via clever regression discontinuity design comparing winners/losers barely re-elected. Tenure boosts chances relatives get elected later. This was confirmed later by Querubin16for Philippines. But similar methods applied elsewhere showed opposite stories-in Norway(Fiva&Smith18)&UK(Van Coppenolle17), losing incumbents still saw relatives elected after them. So it seems tenure only matters causally under presidential systems rather than parliamentary ones generally.
The Story in Canada
Back when Canada was colonial, it was controlled mostly by powerful elite groups known as Family Compact(Ontario)and Château Clique(Quebec)(Tepperman72). These clans held government land&power tightly, having sway especially over executive councils+upper houses which governors appointed(Dawson37 [65],54). While their grip loosened after Confederation67, some old power traces lingered throughout20th century particularly Senate appointments.
Also, the early colonial assemblies which predate formal parties probably helped make family clans strong players. The first elections involved few voters, often corrupt, and rivalries were about land/resources not ideology(Hughes43; Miner39). Politics became personalized, name recognition mattered greatly allowing families coordinate votes exchanging favors/jobs/gifts(Lemieux71; March74). Though patronage reforms started federally early20th century, family control lasted longer provincially giving kinship networks more staying power(Lemieux75).
So we’d expect strong family influence during19th century Canadian politics. But less so after since wider voting rights post-Confederation reduced small group domination. Moreover, new immigrants diversified population changing parliament’s makeup(Ogmundson&Mclaughlin92). All together, mass appeal campaigns likely weakened dynastic importance though family ties might’ve stayed important behind scenes especially around cabinet selection.
Plenty examples exist: Federally Justin Trudeau’s dad Pierre served long terms + grandpa James Sinclair was cabinet member. At provincial Quebec level Premier Honoré Mercier’s son Honoré II plus grandkids(Gaspard Fauteux etc.), his son-in-law Lomer Gouin, and great-great-grandson Thomas Mulcair all served. Ontario’s Ford clan includes Rob Sr. who joined legislature ’95 son Doug now premier grandson Michael holds cabinet post. Nova Scotia had Gerald Regan(Premier70-78) whose father-in-law John Harrison sat federally plus son Geoff Regan MP/Speaker daughter-in-law Kelly Regan provincial minister.
How We Did It
Our goal here was measuring how much being born into a political family helps you succeed. We used big datasets covering legislators from Ontario/Quebec/Nova Scotia/New Brunswick dating back centuries. Information includes age, dob, gender, political party(if any), job, birthplace, religion, family links(Rivard et al.,2024). We follow Dal Bó’s definition calling someone part of a ‘dynasty’ if they had family already elected before them. Or those who start new branches count too. Family links are tracked only within same chamber – e. g. Justin Trudeau connects federally w/father Pierre/grandfather, but Caroline Mulroney isn’t counted since Brian Mulroney wasn’t Ontario legislature member. Our unit is individual legislator looking at their careers/events separately.
Provincial bios came from official sources/parliamentary records. We combined multiple sources for Quebec/Nova Scotia including extensive biographies. For Ontario/New Brunswick we used official bios + Dictionary Canadian Biography. Federal data came from Parliament Canada’s public dataset listing relations among MPs/Senators since1867 detailing kinship info too.Family relations identified included siblings, in-laws(parents, kids, aunts/uncles, cousins, etc.), godparents/children step-relations half-siblings. You get full spectrum basically.Of course, we admit limits. Data on current officials limited sometimes recent kin might be missing. And older archives incomplete sometimes leaving gaps. Still, this dataset remains best historical record compiled yet. For fuller details see Rivard et al.(2024).Biographies linked w/election results(Canadian Elections Database, Sayers17 +provincial election bodies)data starting1867 onwards which include if legislator joined cabinet. Federal data covers MPs/senators nationwide combining parliamentary bio+candidate-level election results(Sevi21).We ran models testing whether having prior relative boosts chances someone gets elected later/shows electoral gains. All regressions factor province+parliament session fixed effects capturing unobserved local/time trends esp. provincially going back centuries.
History of Dynastic Connections
Figure 1 shows family dynasty members have been a staple in both provincial and federal Canadian politics for a long time. First panel shows the share of current legislators who had a family member elected before their start(herecalled pre-relative); second panel shows if they got a future family member elected(after post-relative). About 11.8% of provincial members had pre-relatives and12% got post-relatives.
Figure 1. Share of Lawmakers with Prior and Future Family Members.
Note : Figure shows propotion of lawmakes per province with at least one prior-family-member(elected before initial entry)(pre-relative: first panel) versus at-least-one-post-relative(following election)(post-relative : second panel). The line marks confederation in1867.
Dynastic ties show up more in Qubec(more thantypical):16.2% had prior-family-members whereas Ontario hasonlyabout7.4%, New Brunswick9.4%, Nova Scotia13.7%. For post-relatives, Qubec isagain top at16.8%, Nova Scotia13.3%, New Brunswick9.5% and Ontariojustunder8 %.
Figure 1 confirms dynasties declined overtime in all four provinces. During first-half nineteenth-century, both Nova Scotia and Qubec saw up to50 % of lawmakes with prior-relatives. This rates as higher_than British or U. S. congresses from same time(period)(Van Coppenollesmith22). Dynastic rate in Ontario and Qubec began to drop mid-century. And all-provinces seemed to decline until confederation. Then it climbed back upagain post-confederation. Newfederal system seems_to_have_shifted_political_landscape_and_created_room_for_new_dynastie s.
Figure Two Proportion Of Legislators With Prior And Future Relatives By Chamber Type At Federal Level
The House Of Commons And Senate Have Dynastic Links But Less Frequent Than Provinces. MPs With Prior Or Future Relatives Make Up Just Under Five Percent Each Senators Show Higher Shares About Nine And Seven Percent Respectively. Figure Two Tracks Trends Over Time Limited To Those Who Were Only MPs Or Only Senators.
Federal MPs Show Declining Dynasty Shares Over Time Senates Tell Different Story Share Of Senators With Predecessors Rose Until Mid Twentieth Century Appointments Were Lifetime Until Sixty Five Meaning Fewer Openings For New Members And Changes In Power Dynamic.
The Senate Resembles UK’S Old House Of Lords More Than Elected Chambers Although Not Hereditary Like Peerage System Still Family Connections Clearly Influenced Appointments Suggesting Patronage Played Role Despite Official Non-Hereditary Status(Vanden Beukel Et Al., Twenty Twenty One).Modelling Dynastic Continuity
Table One Shows Whether Having An Earlier Family Member Predicts Later Ones Entering Same Legislature. Models Include Occupations Controlled For Outsiders Women Etc. Pre Relatives Positively Affect Chances That Later Relatives Get Elected Both Provincially And Federally Table Full Details Follow.
The Outcome Variable Is Binary Indicating If Politician Has Post Relative Predictor Main Focus Is Binary Indicator Of Pre Relative Presence Covariates Include Various Occupations Outsider Status Gender Models Range From Simple To Complex Including Fixed Effects Based On Province Parliament Session Data Restricted To People Born Before Nineteen Fifty Excluding Those Dying In Office.
The Results Are Consistent Across Models Showing Positive Statistically Significant Effect Of Having Pre Relative Increased Probability Between Six And Twelve Percent Depending On Chamber Confirming Strong Link Between Past Family Presence And Future Political Success Within Families.
Turning To Electoral Advantages Table Two Examines Vote Share Differences At First Election Among Those With Versus Without Pre Relatives Limiting Sample To First Successful Contests Given Missing Candidate Loss Data Findings Reveal Slight Electoral Boost About One Point Five Percent Vote Share Only Provincially Supporting Small Initial Edge For Dynasts Voter Recognition Might Help Early Campaign Stages Especially Locally Results Confirm Appendix Table One Mirrors These Findings.
Beyond Votes Career Progression Matters Cabinet Appointments Represent Key Steps Many Factors Influence Selection Historically Including Language Region Religion Now Gender Ethnic Background Yet Evidence Shows Members From Political Families Get Cabinet Roles More Often Past Examples From UK Ireland Support Similar Patterns Possibly Because Parliamentary Systems Draw Cabinets Directly From Legislature Where Name Recognition Helps Advance Careers Internally.
Descriptional Data Supports This Too Among Twenty Three Prime Ministers Nearly Fourteen Percent Belonged To Dynasties Nearly Third Had Descendants Elected Premiers Show Even Higher Rates Cabinet Members Around Nineteen To Thirty Percent Part Of Political Families Appointment Patterns May Reflect Persistent Biases Plus Patronage Practices Especially Before Recent Reforms Seen Similarly For Senate Seats Once Considered Rewards Linked Heavily With Party Loyalty.<Table Three Title Career Advancement Related To Previous Family Membership Displays Odds Ratios Showing Significant Gains For Dynasty Members Being Twice As Likely Added Cabinet Seats Both Levels Also Greater Chance Getting Senate Appointment Reinforcing Idea That Familial Networks Matter Strongly When Higher Office Choices Made Contrary To Popular Ballots Alone.This Indicates Electoral Advantages Aren’t Huge Dynasts Gain Career Perks Mainly After Winning Office Which Points Toward Insider Promotions Rather Than Voter Preference Driving Continued Power Concentrations Within Families Form Links Stay Strong Through Executive Selections Not Simply Election Victories<Table Four Highlights Relationship Between Legislator Tenure Length And Subsequent Family Elections Findings Suggest Longer Service Modestly Raises Chance Others Follow Them Provincially Federal Similar Magnitude Valid Even Post Confederation Era Implies Experience Helps Promote Dynasty Expansion But Can't Fully Explain Origins All By ItselfDal Bo Et Al Emphasize Possible Confounders Due Unseen Traits Shared Across Generations Leading Them Use Regression Discontinuity Design Comparing Narrow Wins/Losses Assuming Close Outcomes Equalize Hidden Qualities Highlight Causal Role Tenure Plays Encouraging More Relatives Enter Politics Using Their Approach We Check Whether Surviving Multiple Terms Causes More Kin Entries Using Similar Instruments Win Indicators Define Long Term<Fig Three Visualizes Gap Around Five Percent Margins Shows Trends First Re-election Winners Compared Losers Provincial/Federal Elections Slight Increase Among Near Losers Suggests Narrow Miss Does Not Stop Familial Success Futures Decline Past Margin Slightly Provincially Rise Federally Meaning Other Mechanisms Beyond Tenure Help Maintain Dynastic Chains<Table Five Presents Instrumental Variable Regression Results Confirm Long Term Linked Positively With Winning Re-election As Expected But No Statistically Significant Effect Detected Linking Longer Tenures Causally With Future Family Entries Both Arena Confirms Lack Clear Causal Path Instead Other Factors Like Personal Reputation Local Networks May Matter More Than Length Alone<H Two Conclusion
This Work Adds Valuable Insight Into How Political Families Persist In Canadian Legislative History Covering Several Provinces Before After Confederation Found Small Vote Benefits At Provincial Level Yet Clear Perks Accessing Cabinet Or Senate Seats Crucially Differentiated From US Case No Proof Long Service Drives Dynasty Formation Matching UK Experiences Instead Our Study Highlights Importance Institutional Settings Affect Strength Longevity Political Lineages Despite Decentralized Party Systems Candidate Centered Elections Modernization Institutional Reform Appear Responsible For Weakening Traditional Clan Dominance Unlike Japan Ireland Where Parties Weak Personalized Contests Keep Clans Alive Changing Demographics Immigration Urbanization Education Mass Media Impact Voting Behavior Possibly Diluting Old Kinship Bonds Particularly Outside Homogeneous Regions Like Quebec Important Since Candidate Selection Methods Could Provide Alternative Pathways For Dynasts Especially During Primaries Fundraising Etc Which Deserve Further Research Senate/Cabinet Result Emphasis Underscores Role Non-electoral Mechanisms Helping Preserve Power Concentrated Within Few Families Future Work Should Explore Committee Chairs Bill Sponsorship Debates Plus Broader Civil Service Job Access Offered By Familial Ties Extending Influence Beyond Legislature Itself Finally Parliamentary Vs Presidential Difference Evident Here American Model Sees Electorate Voting Preferences Favor Early Advantages While UK Canadian Parliaments Allow Elite Controls Amplify Lineage Effects Through Appointed Bodies Opens Questions About US Upper Chamber Past Appointment Practices Worth Exploring At State Colonial Levels Where Professionalism Varied In The End Our Findings Raise Democratic Fairness Concerns If Family Names Continue Grant Entry Into Privileged Positions Cutting Off Opportunities For Talented Non-Dynasts Especially Regarding Cabinet/Senate Jobs Showing Structural Inequality Persists Thanks Partly To These Kin Networks
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