Take a look at this image (Figure 1). It’s the year 1819, and the location is Manchester, up in northern England. The event was a huge rally pushing for voting rights to be expanded. Around 60,000 to 80,000 people showed up-a massive crowd for that time, about a tenth of Greater Manchester’s population. The city leaders got nervous and sent in the yeoman cavalry. But they panicked and charged into the crowd, trampling folks under horses’ hooves and cutting them with their sabers. Seventeen men, women, and kids died; over five hundred were hurt.
Figure 1 The Peterloo Massacre, 1819
Source: British Museum 1871, 0812.5310.
Right after it happened, newspapers called it the “Peterloo Massacre.” “Peter” because it took place on St. Peter’s Field, and “loo” as a nod to Waterloo where Napoleon was defeated not long before. Whose Waterloo this really was was debatable though. City leaders hoped this would stop all the talk about expanding voting rights. But reform supporters saw those who died as heroes and pushed even harder for change. Artists jumped on board too-Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote a poem in 1819 called “The Masque of Anarchy,” which some say is one of the best political poems in English (Holmes Reference Holmes1974, 532). In an important part of the poem he calls out to the people:
Rise like Lions after slumber
In unvanquishable number-
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you-
Ye are many-they are few.
Those lines get right to the core question behind this talk. How do you get big crowds of people to stand up like lions? We know collective action matters a lot politically-it sparks revolutions; wins civil rights; fights against extinction of species including our own. But how do you actually convince people to join in? Why would any one person show up at that rally knowing their vote wouldn’t matter much anyway-and also knowing there was real danger from armed cavalry?
Free Riding and Selective Incentives Miss Some Points
Economists and political scientists think they’ve got a handle on why it’s tough getting folks involved in collective efforts-and how to fix that.
They say free riding is the problem here. If what you want is a public good-that everyone benefits from once it’s available-and if joining costs you something personally, then why bother paying when you can get it for free? (Olson Reference Olson1965, chap. 1).
Their solution? Give selective incentives-that is benefits only given to those who actually participate (Olson Reference Olson1965, chap. 1). For example: unions can’t just say “join us because we get higher wages”-since all workers might get those wages anyway whether they’re members or not-so they offer perks just for members like discounts on life insurance.
Sure, sometimes free riding causes problems and selective incentives help-but it’s not always so simple. Take strikes as an example-the union member might save $200 yearly on insurance but lose $1,000 each week they’re striking without pay! According to political economy logic about selective incentives motivating participation here.. well, it doesn’t quite add up. So while these ideas explain some parts of collective action motivation-they don’t cover everything perfectly.
Facing Up To The Problem Of Feeling Ineffective
There’s actually a bigger problem when trying to motivate collective action-something I call “the curse of inconsequentialism.” Understanding this helps reveal new ways groups can still manage to come together.
Think about every little person pictured at Peterloo Massacre rally-they probably knew deep down their presence alone wouldn’t change whether voting rights got extended or not! Even if they cared deeply about extending voting rights… why take big risks if their single attendance makes no difference?
There are some common ways people try dodging this problem-but none fully solve how everyone gets motivated.
One way involves irrational hope-or “wishful thinking.” Maybe someone convinces themselves their presence will tip things over-even if that’s unlikely or crazy [Elster Reference Elster1989, 37-38]. H. L Mencken famously said no one ever lost anything by underestimating Americans’ intelligence (Mencken Reference Mencken and Nolte1922), so maybe crazy hope plays some role-but surely not all participation can be explained by that alone.>>Another approach appeals to identity politics-it flips “what difference does my act make?” into “what difference does doing what fits my identity make?”Think back on Montgomery bus boycott ’56 – Black folks refused buses over segregation for more than year. If someone asked why one boycotts buses knowing personal actions won’t change campaign outcome – reply might be ‘No illusions there but Dr King said Black folk boycott buses so I do.’Some movements work like that. But many participants don’t share that same identity. Look back at ’64 Freedom Riders killed by KKK – two white New Yorkers among victims. That famous line ‘it’s what Black folks do’ doesn’t explain them. And often self-view as activist comes after deciding join movement rather than before. So identity explains some cases but certainly not all participation.A New Way To Look At Collective Action
Now I want offer fresh idea explaining why people join collective efforts. The twist is using ‘inconsequentialism’ itself-not as curse-but as key insight.Remember how usually we think feeling ‘ineffective’ stops participation? Surveys show feeling personal efficacy strongly links with joining protests or politics generally(Almond & Verba1963; Campbell et al1954&1960; Verba & Nie1972). If you feel powerless, you probably won’t jump in. That’s well known.But wait -that only tells half story. It talks about ‘individual efficacy.’What most forget is ‘group efficacy.’Evidence shows that when people believe group effort will succeed , they’re more likely join( Bandura2000)Footnote1. And even controlling for individual sense of making difference , people still prefer groups seen likely winners(Finkel & Muller1998; Klandermans1984; Koch1993; Zomeren et al2012).Folks Like Backing WinnersThis forms first part of my argument. People enjoy being part of winning teams. Don’t just trust surveys -look around. Fan support drops quickly when sports teams lose. Meanwhile researchers find baseball team losing ten percent games leads fans dropping six – twelve percent next season(Moskowitz & Wertheim2011).Organizers use similar ideas. In Birmingham desegregation campaign Martin Luther King Jr told followers:There are those who write history. There are those who make history. There are those who experience history. I don’t know how manyofyouwouldbewritablehistorybook. Butyoucertainlymakinghistory, andyouareexperiencinghistory. Andyouwillmakeitpossibleforthehistoriansoffuturetowriteamarvelouschapter(quotedin Branch Reference Branch1988).Dr King basically said his followers were backing winners.Scholars have noticed backing winners often motivates collective action too. Footnote2Russell Hardin noted civilrightsmovementsatitspeakwas“experience not tomiss,” likeningjoiningwar1943asanonce-in-generationthing. Evenifparticipantsknewtheirpartwontipoutcometotalsuccess, theyrepridebeingpartofmovementmakingsignificanthistory. Brian Barry arguednoonewantstowastetheirtime, movementslikelytobemoresupportedifchancesuccessarehigher.All togethersurveydata, sportsexamples, socialleadersandacademicsagreepeoplepreferwinninggroups. No matter if their own role decisive. That’s foundation #oneofmytheory.<h3class = "B “Redundancy Boosts Group Strength”Second piece says groups win better with lots extra members able replace each other. Footnote3These backup players are called “cogs,” hence lecture title. Footnote4Military knows value interchangeable parts. Backin1785 Honoré Blanc showed mass-produced muskets work. He took apart50 muskets, mixed parts, and rebuilt50 perfect guns. French army loved idea. Ambassador Thomas Jefferson witnessed it, took conceptto US, setuparmoriesproducingstandardrifles(Roser2015; Shapiro&Varian1999). Footnote6Modern examples include backup systems on ships, fighters, andspaceships. They’re lifesavers. Ifprimaryfailsbackup kicksin. Not redundant ex ante, but absolutely needed(Bendor1985; Perrow1984; Frederickson&La Porte2002).Social movements need such backups. They need replacement leaders ready if main ones fall. Footnote7A great example comes from Martin Luther King Jr. He always stressed he was replaceable. During Montgomery bus boycott his house bombed but he reassuredcrowd:“If I am stopped, thismovementwillnotstop”(quotedin Branch1988). He added,“Rememberifanythinghappens tome others will take my place”(quoted Azbell1956). Footnote8Leaders stress dispensability, but foot soldiers also gain strength knowing others stand ready. This redundancy makes movement stronger, increasing odds success. Makes involvement feel worth it too.Finally, Forbothleadersandfoot soldiers, redundancyisvalued. Itstrengthensmovements, makessuccessmorelikely, andthismakesjoiningfeelbetter.Bringing It All Together – The Cog Theory ExplainedNowlet’sputtheseideas sidebyside. Peoplelikejoininggroupslikelytowin. Groupswinbetterwhenmanyredundantmemberscanreplaceeachother. So, inconsequentialismmaycurbindividualefficacy, butboostsgroupefficacy. Andbecausepeoplepreferwinninggroups, theirownlackimpacthelpsgroupwin. Thismotivatesthemjoin. Itskindofanironysounding. Butknowingyou’rejustacogmightactuallypushyoutakepartinthemovement. Somethinglikewhathappenedat Peterloomassacre, ratherthanholdpeoploff.* Fromamoralpointview, youmightthinkthisfindingtroubling. Ofcoursegoodthatwecangetpeople involvedimportantcauses. Butnotallcollectiveactionaims good. Somecauseharmorareblindto consequences. Pushingparticipationbecause you’re inconsequential might encourage careless behavior.* Normativelysome may try tweak theoryforethicalcomfort.* Empirically though, much collective action includes bad causes. Social sciences benefit from explainingalltypes actions-even badones. Knowingwhypeoplejoinbadcollectives helps understand society better.*
Source link
